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INTRODUCTION
The 1990s brought significant developments in the field of
information technology. These stimulated the creation of a new
global market for electronic information services and products,
which is occupied substantially by electronic databases. The
emergence of these new technological developments challenged
many branches of the law, including intellectual property. A
particularly prominent part of this debate is how the law should
address the protection of electronic databases.
The debate over database protection in the United States can be
traced back to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.1 In Feist, the
Court found “white pages” telephone directories to be noncopyrightable.2 The Court held that the touchstone for copyright
protection is creative originality, and that this requirement is
constitutionally mandated.3 The Court’s determination “inevitably
means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin.
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains
free to use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in
preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does
not feature the same selection and arrangement.”4 Feist thus ended
the tradition in some courts of providing copyright protection
based on the labor invested in creating the work and declared the
deaths of the “sweat of the brow” and “industrious collection”
doctrines.5
The debate gained additional prominence due to a number of
worldwide initiatives that extended or considered extending much
more extensive legal protection for databases. Notably, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPs Agreement”) introduced minimum standards regarding
copyright protection for databases.6 For several years the World
1

499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See id. at 340.
3
See id.
4
Id. at 349.
5
See id. at 359–60.
6
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 81, 87–93 (1994), 1994 WL 327459 (I.L.M.) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
2
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Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) had also considered
providing broader intellectual property rights in databases than the
United States.7 Furthermore, the European Union’s Directive on the
Legal Protection of Databases (“Database Directive”), adopted in
1996, constituted the most comprehensive attempt to provide
protection to databases. It granted a fifteen-year, renewable sui
generis right to prevent the extraction and utilization of raw data
from a database.8
The adoption of the Database Directive has sparked an ongoing
debate over bills drafted in the U.S. Congress to address the legal
protection of databases.9 In particular, a number of legal scholars
have voiced their opinions on the question of how Congress should
react to the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist and the EU’s
subsequent enactment of the Database Directive.10 Most of this
scholarship, however, has simply accepted the argument, advanced
by some segments of the database industry and others, that Feist
creates a problem, that this problem is exacerbated by the EU’s
Database Directive, and that this problem needs to be solved.11
Much of the scholarly discussion has also been dedicated to
criticizing the United States’ proposed bills because of the risks
they supposedly pose to the database industry generally and
specifically to groups such as the scientific and educational

7

WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, at Art. I, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
8
See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the legal protection of databases, art. 10(1) and 10(3), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML.
9
See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Makoto Jono, The Database Protection Debate in the
106th Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869, 887–91 (2001).
10
See, e.g., id. at 887–88.
11
See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003:
Joint Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong.
27 (2003) (statement of David Carson, General Counsel, Copyright Office of the U.S.,
Library of Cong.) [hereinafter H.R. 3261 Hearing]; see also Band & Jono, supra note 9,
at 871.
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communities.12 The academic debate has, therefore, also focused
on suggesting new and improved forms of protection that Congress
could enact.13 The United States, however, has not yet adopted
any protective measure to remedy the alleged problem in the
database industry.
This Article wishes to explore the Feist decision and its
progeny, critically analyzing courts’ decisions after Feist. The
Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s
decision in Feist, its holdings and shortcomings. Part II discusses
several post-Feist cases, exploring the different approaches
employed by courts in analyzing what if any aspects of
compilations are copyrightable. Part III of this Article then
explores the creative selection and arrangement standard and the
scope of protection granted under this standard as well as its
application to databases. The Article concludes with some
suggestions and concluding remarks concerning how to bring
about better clarity and guidance concerning copyright protection
for databases and compilations.
I. FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO.
A. Discussion of the Court’s Decision
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. is
recognized as the Supreme Court’s first attempt to bring order to a
very complex and increasingly critical issue: the application of
copyright law to factual compilations.14 In Feist, the Court found a
“white pages” telephone directory to be non-copyrightable, holding
that the sole basis for protection under United States copyright law

12

See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionistic Intellectual Property
Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 319–21 (2003).
13
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works
of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 340 (1992)
(suggesting a federal anticopying statute with collective licensing) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
No Sweat]; J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?,
50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 145 (1997) (suggesting a modified liability approach).
14
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340–41 (1991).
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is creative originality.15 With this decision, a unanimous Supreme
Court sounded the death knell for the “sweat of the brow doctrine,”
also known as the “industrious collection doctrine.”16 Under these
doctrines, the courts moved the concept of originality, with its
focus on individuality and the creative process to the background
and placed renewed emphasis on labor and effort as a basis for
copyright compilations.17 Although on its face this decision
clarified the law by invalidating the above doctrines as tests for
assessing copyrightability in factual compilations, the availability
of copyright for factual compilations has not become predictable or
stable after Feist.
Feist involved the copyrightability of a white pages telephone
directory.18 The plaintiff and respondent, Rural Telephone Service
Company (“Rural”), held a monopoly franchise that permitted it to
provide telephone service to a number of communities in Kansas.19
Pursuant to state law, Rural produced an annually updated
telephone directory that contained a typical white pages section
which listed the names of residents alphabetically by last name.20
The defendant and petitioner, Feist Publications, Inc. (“Feist”), was
a publishing company that produced area-wide telephone books.
The directory at issue in the litigation contained over 46,000
telephone listings and covered eleven different service areas.21
The area covered by Feist’s directory overlapped with a portion of
that serviced by Rural.22
In preparing its directory, Feist successfully obtained
permission to use the white pages from ten of the eleven telephone
companies whose listings it wished to duplicate.23 Rural was the
only company that refused to license its information to Feist. This
refusal, however, did not deter Feist from basing part of its
15

See id. at 340.
See id. at 341.
17
See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d
Cir. 1922).
18
Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
19
See id. at 342.
20
Id.
21
See id. at 343.
22
See id. at 342–43.
23
See id. at 343.
16
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directory on Rural’s white pages by simply taking the desired
portion of Rural’s listings and incorporated it into its own
directory.24 Rural discovered the copying and subsequently sued
Feist for copyright infringement.25 The district court found Feist
liable,26 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision.27 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably to resolve a split in
the circuits over the extent of protection available to fact works.28
Feist presented the Court with the very conflict that the circuit
courts had found so troubling. The Court had two options for
resolving this conflict. On the one hand, it could use the “sweat of
the brow” or “industrious collection” doctrines29 and extend
meaningful protection to Rural,30 thereby eroding the wellestablished proposition that “originality is a . . . prerequisite for
copyright protection.”31 Or, the Court could apply the “creative
selection” principle, derived from decisions such as Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony32 and Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.,33 which would leave Rural with no effective
protection against competitors like Feist who appropriated valuable

24

Id. at 342–44. Feist’s employees conducted additional research to verify and
augment Rural’s listings. Id. at 343–44. Despite this, four entirely fictitious listings
created by Rural were reproduced in Feist’s directory. Id. at 344. This certainly supports
Feist’s wholesale appropriation of information from Rural’s directory.
25
Id. at 344.
26
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987).
27
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
28
Feist, 499 U.S. at 360 (noting that, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Second and Fifth
circuits had rejected copyright protection for factual compilations); see also infra notes
29–33.
29
Under these doctrines, copyright was a reward “for the hard work that went into
compiling facts,” rather than for creativity and originality. See id. at 352.
30
One might argue that the sweat of the brow theory does not extend protection to
Rural because Rural expended no meaningful effort in assigning and printing the
telephone numbers of its customers. Since state law required Rural to publish its
directory, the cost of doing so was presumably built into the rates Rural charged its
customers. Denying copyright in this case would, thus, neither damage the incentives for
producing telephone white pages nor deprive Rural of a fair economic return. The Eighth
Circuit, however, had expressly rejected such an argument. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v.
Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131–32 (8th Cir. 1985).
31
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
32
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
33
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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information.34 Such a resolution, however, might be viewed as
unfair and unwise as a matter of policy.35
As the above discussion suggests, both options required the
Court to construct justifications for its decision. In other words, if
the Court decided for the defendant, it would have to square its
doctrinal choice with notions of fairness and public policy. If it
decided for the plaintiff, it would have to explain why it had
chosen to ignore the guidance of its own well-established
originality requirement. The Court chose the former option,
endorsing the creative selection approach.
The Court began by restating basic doctrines. The Court
reviewed the history of copyright protection for compilations and
the development of the sweat of the brow or industrious collection
doctrines, unequivocally repudiating both doctrines. Originality,
the Court explained, must have two components: “independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity.”36 However, the Court
emphasized that the creativity requirement is extremely modest:
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, no
matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.37
The Court explained that Congress, in enacting the Copyright
Act of 1976, intended to overrule the sweat of the brow doctrine
and require originality in order to protect compilations.38 It
discerned such intent, in part, from the newly introduced definition
of “compilation” in the 1976 Act: “A work formed by the
collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
34

The creative selection principle affords protection only to compilations of facts
featuring “original selection, coordination, or arrangement,” no matter how valuable the
underlying facts themselves are. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 360 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
35
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1938 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Creation and Commerical Value].
36
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
37
Id. at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Id. at 354–56.
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resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship.”39 The Court then listed the elements of authorship
that are protected in a compilation: the selection, coordination and
arrangement of the underlying material.40 Finally, the Court
emphasized that applying the creative selection approach to factual
compilations:
inevitably means that the copyright in a factual
compilation is thin.
Notwithstanding a valid
copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to
use the facts contained in another’s publication to
aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection
and arrangement.41
With this very statement, the Court completely reversed earlier
judicial approaches of a substantial minority of the circuits which
had held that any substantial appropriation of material from a
copyrightable compilation was an infringement.42 Relying on the
sweat of the brow doctrine, these courts had previously required
late-comers independently to collect material for a competing
compilation.43 Nevertheless, the Court’s holding reflected wellknown doctrines and conclusions, embraced by the majority of
circuit courts. The Court, therefore, could have simply applied the
creative selection approach of Burrow-Giles and Bleistein to the
facts of the case and reached the same result. The Court, however,
chose a different path, perhaps deciding that doctrine alone was an
39

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 356–57.
41
Id. at 349.
42
See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83, 88–89
(2d Cir. 1922) (“[A] subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that
which the first compiler has done. . . . [G]enerally he is not entitled to take one word of
information previously published, without independently working out the matter for
himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common source of information,
and the only use that he can legitimately make of a previous publication is to verify his
own calculations and results when obtained.”).
43
See, e.g., Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 219 (D. Kan.
1987) (“Courts recognize that a compiler of a directory may make fair use of an existing
compilation if he first makes an independent canvass, then merely compares and checks
his own compilation with that of the copyrighted publication and publishes the result
after verifying the additional items derived from the copyrighted publication.”).
40
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insufficient basis on which to uphold the creative selection
approach. Moving beyond statutory interpretation, the Court held
that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.”44 Citing
nineteenth-century case law, the Court derived this requirement
from references in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause
to “Writings” and “Authors.”45 The Court suggested that these
terms “presuppose a degree of originality.”46
But the Court went even further, explaining why the concerns
raised by sweat of the brow proponents were outweighed by the
Constitution’s originality requirement.47 The Court recognized the
possible unfairness of failing to protect a compiler’s labor, but
explained that the fact that a compiler’s labor may sometimes be
“used without compensation by others” is “not ‘some unforeseen
byproduct of a statutory scheme’ but is, rather, ‘the essence of
copyright.’”48 By announcing that “[t]he primary objective of
copyright is . . . to promote the progress of science and useful
arts,”49 the Court endorsed the view that copyright is meant only to
advance the public welfare and not to secure the rights of authors.
Regarding the possibility that protecting a compiler’s labor might
be necessary to encourage the desired production of factual
compilations, the Court stated that the creative selection approach
correctly implemented copyright’s policy of encouragement.50
44

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The Court hinted, however, that other
forms of protection might not be subject to the same constitutional restriction. See id. at
354 (“Protection for the fruits of such research . . . may in certain circumstances be
available under a theory of unfair competition.” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04, at 3–23 (1990))).
46
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
47
Id. at 349–51.
48
Id. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
49
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50
Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work . . . . This principle, known as the idea/expression
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation,
assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler’s selection and
arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither
unfair not unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art.”).
45
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Having found copyright’s originality requirement to be
constitutionally mandated, the Court proceeded to explain how the
sweat of the brow doctrine could not coexist with the creative
selection approach.51 The Court went on to suggest that courts that
had adopted the sweat of the brow doctrine simply misunderstood
the copyright statute.52 The Court supported this conclusion by
recapping the copyright statute’s legislative history53 that referred
to the originality standard when it defined the phrase “original
works of authorship.”54
Having completed its attack on the sweat of the brow doctrine,
the Court concluded its opinion by applying the originality/creative
selection requirement to Feist’s compilation. The Court reasoned
that Rural’s case hinged on whether Feist copied anything
“original” from Rural.55 The Court concluded that Feist did not
copy any original material and accordingly reversed the lower
courts.56
Understanding how and why the Court reached its finding of
non-infringement also uncovers its strong desire to rule on the
selection and arrangement question.
The Court began by
identifying what Feist copied from Rural, stating that Feist
appropriated “1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from
Rural’s white pages.”57 One might then have expected the Court to
proceed by analyzing whether Feist borrowed any selection or
arrangement,58 since copyright could extend only to the selection
and arrangement of the underlying information. However, even if
the Court had proceeded this way, it would almost certainly still
51

Id. at 353–54.
Id. at 352 (“But some courts misunderstood the statute. These courts ignored §§ 3
and 4 . . . . Making matters worse, these courts developed a new theory to justify the
protection of factual compilations. Known alternatively as ‘sweat of the brow’ or
‘industrious collection,’ the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the
hard work that went into compiling facts.” (citing Leon v. Pac. Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th
Cir. 1937); Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.
1922))).
53
Id. at 354–61
54
Id. at 355 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102).
55
Id. at 361.
56
Id. at 363.
57
Id. at 361.
58
Feist admitted that the directory as a whole was copyrightable. See id.
52

C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/26/2011 6:41 PM

PROTECTION FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKS

621

have found for Feist as Feist had copied Rural’s underlying
material without appropriating an original selection or
arrangement.59 Such a finding would have been entirely consistent
with the Court’s statement that “copyright in a factual compilation
is thin.”60
But, the Court did not do this. Instead, the Court apparently
assumed that Feist did take Rural’s selection and arrangement, if
only to reach the question of whether Rural’s white pages selection
and arrangement were copyrightable. The Court concluded that
Rural’s selection of listings was “obvious,” and its arrangement
was “not only unoriginal, it [was] practically inevitable,”61
explaining:
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of
Rural’s white pages do not satisfy the minimum
constitutional standards for copyright protection . . .
. Rural’s white pages are entirely typical . . . . In
preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the
data provided by its subscribers and lists it
alphabetically by surname. The end product is a
garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity.62
However, the Court acknowledged that the telephone white
pages were an extreme case, falling into a “narrow category of
works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as
to be virtually nonexistent,”63 and that “the vast majority of
compilations will pass” the originality test.64
B. Analysis of the Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision in Feist has three main
components. The first point was that one cannot acquire a
copyright solely because of her sweat or industriousness in
collecting the underlying material. However, this point, though
59
60
61
62
63
64

See id. at 343–44.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 359.
Id.
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important, is hardly earth shaking. As I have argued elsewhere, a
historical analysis reveals that most circuit courts had already
reached the same conclusion prior to the Court’s decision in
Feist.65 In fact, only a small number of courts had granted
copyright protection to factual compilations based on the sweat or
industriousness expended by the compiler, with such decisions
generally only granted in response to the pleas of producers of
telephone directories and maps who claimed they had labored hard
to produce their works.66 In these cases, apparently moved by the
equities of the cases, courts purported to rely on copyright law to
justify their holdings, although their reasoning seems to be more in
line with the misappropriation doctrine enunciated in cases such as
International News Service v. Associated Press.67
“The second point in the Feist decision was that the Court held
that a second compiler does not infringe a copyright when using
facts gathered by a first compiler.”68 This decision, however, was
also unexceptional given the reality that copyright law has not
protected facts under the 1909 Copyright Act and subsequent
copyright statutes,69 a point I have argued previously.70 Requiring
people to repeat all of the necessary time-consuming steps taken to
gather information is simply inefficient.
The last and most important point in the Court’s analysis was
the Court’s constitutionalization of the originality requirement in
copyright law. “Although it was clearly unnecessary to decide the
case on constitutional grounds since statutory grounds would have
sufficed, the Court held that the Constitution required a minimum
amount of originality or creativity in order for a work to be eligible
for copyright protection.”71 Indeed, prior to Feist, no other cases

65
Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under Copyright Law
During the 19th and 20th Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115 (2006).
[hereinafter Bitton, Trends].
66
Id.
67
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
68
Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 172.
69
Id. at 136 (showing that “[t]he prevailing approach under the 1909 Act, even in
those courts adhering strictly to the industrious collection doctrine, was that facts and
other indispensable materials are uncopyrightable”).
70
Id.
71
Id.
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had stated explicitly that originality is constitutionally mandated,
though one could argue that the Court’s decision in Sarony
suggested this implicitly.72
“Feist thus sounded the death knell for the sweat of the brow
doctrine.”73 One might even be surprised that it took the Court 200
years to arrive at such a fundamental decision given the many
opportunities it had to explain the terms “Author” and “Writings.”
However, when one examines the legal landscape and historical
context within which Feist was decided, one begins to understand
why the Court likely viewed constitutionalization of the originality
requirement as necessary,74 even if Feist was not necessarily the

72

See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (“We
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing
copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual
conceptions of the author.”); Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 128–29.
73
See Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 179.
74
But see Robert Kreiss, Copyright Protection for Computer Databases, CD-ROMS
And Factual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 323, 327 (1992) (arguing that the
Court in Feist failed to deal with the possibility that constitutional grant of power to
Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” might contain some
breathing room and that the Copyright Clause could have been interpreted broadly so that
Congress could give copyright protection to some works whose originality is
questionable in order to ensure that no worthwhile work (i.e., one which contributes to
the “progress of science”) is left out); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17
U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 336 (1992) (arguing that the main flaw of the Feist opinion is its
failure to illuminate the process of gathering information and that failure to recognize that
gathering of information at issue in this and other cases involves the exercise of
judgment, which goes to the root of copyright protection); Benjamin B. Thorner,
Copyright Protection for Computer Databases: The Threat of Feist and a Proposed
Solution, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 27 (1997) (arguing that “the idea that functional writings
are unprotectable by copyright is wrongheaded as it hampers creators’ incentives to
profitably bring their goods to the public”); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox:
Feist, “Creativity,” and the Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L.
REV. 549 (1995) (questioning the validity of the “creativity” premise of the Court in Feist
and arguing that the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act suggests that the
drafters did not intend “creativity” to be a required element of copyrightability); Timothy
Young, Copyright Law: Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations: The White
Pages of the Phone Book Are Not Original Enough to Be Copyrighted—But Why?, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 631, 655–58 (1992) (arguing, inter alia, that the Feist decision required
a higher level of originality than is congressionally mandated); Anant S. Narayanan,
Note, Standards of Protection for Databases in the European Community and the United
States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON.
457, 489–91 (1993–1994) (arguing that legislative history and congressional inaction
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“best” factual scenario for establishing order and guidance within
the problematic field of compilation copyright.
“Feist was decided in 1991, exactly when major developments
and breakthroughs in the fields of computers, telecommunications,
and information technologies, as well as the commercialization of
the Internet, were rapidly taking place.”75 The opinion in Feist,
thus, both reflected and signaled the beginning of a new era of
coherence, one which emphasized the constitutional dimensions
constraining intellectual property law doctrines. The opinion also
reflected the great uneasiness with and intolerance of the
industrious collection doctrine that allowed the capture and
enclosure of facts—our building blocks of knowledge—and
signaled a shift away from a focus on the proprietary dimension of
copyright in favor of dissemination of information and ideas.76
Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere, while the industrious
collection doctrine might have been a necessity during the era of
pre-digital, old-fashioned compilations—those in which database
producers did not have the tools at their disposal to recoup their
investment in the creation of their products—Feist represented the
realization that such reasoning is inapplicable to modern electronic
databases.77 A constitutionally-mandated originality requirement
anticipated and prevented the possibility that interest groups would
try to press Congress to pass legislation protecting these building
blocks of knowledge. Indeed, almost all the bills introduced to
cope with the database protection “problem” thus far have failed
mainly because they could not have withstood constitutional
suggest that the Court’s creative originality requirement is not constitutionally
mandated).
75
Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 173.
76
See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am. Inc., 940 F.2d 1471,
1481 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991). Viewing Feist as
revolutionizing the law of copyright, the panel in Cable News Network was persuaded
that Feist signaled a shift away from a focus on the proprietary nature of copyright, in
favor of dissemination of information and ideas. Id. at 1478. Using this as a
philosophical basis, the court concluded that Cable News Network had no copyright in
the news of the day, which apparently included Cable News Network’s own news clips
and its own reports of the news. Id. at 1485. See also David O. Carson, Copyright
Protection for Factual Compilations After Feist: A Practitioner’s View, 17 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 969, 980 (1992).
77
Bitton, Trends, supra note 65, at 173.
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challenges after Feist.78 The Court thus seems to have envisioned
the challenges and technological advances that were to come. The
origins of the jurisprudence inherent in Feist, therefore, necessarily
lie in twentieth century achievements, rather than those of the
nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, despite these important (and largely predictable)
aspects of Feist, the Supreme Court offered no guidance to the
lower courts on the question of creativity in the selection and
arrangement of compilations since it articulated the originality
standard by choosing the weakest possible case: that of a whitepages directory. The following discussion details some of the most
notable problems with the decision’s fact pattern.
First, Feist proved a poor case for the Court to discuss
copyright protection in fact works as it involved no real sweat from
78

The most recent U.S. bill for database protection was the Database and Collections
of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003) (The bill
passed the House Judiciary Committee on Jan. 21, 2004. This bill adopts a pure
misappropriation approach, modeled almost literally after the Second Circuit’s test
formulated in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
Former database protection bills are: Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) (The professed goal of the bill
was to prevent actual or threatened competitive injury by misappropriating a database or
its contents and it proposed a twenty-five-year term of protection. The bill was met with
ample criticism and finally failed, mainly because it contained inadequate exceptions or
privileges to protect the public interest and because the drafters of the bill did not consult
with the relevant scientific and educational communities.); Collection of Information
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) (Although the legislation was styled as a
misappropriation bill based on a tort rather than an intellectual property right theory, the
substantive tests were almost identical to those of H.R. 3531. This bill received support
from a limited number of large database publishers, but was eventually dropped due to
concerns voiced by some government agencies.); Consumer and Investor Access to
Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999) (designed to provide protection
only against unauthorized commercial uses that were “in competition” with the protected
database and would have protected only against duplication of another’s database. The
bill contained exceptions for news reporting use and for scientific, educational, and
research uses, but did not contain a general exception for unauthorized “fair uses” and a
limited term of protection. The lack of these last two ingredients might have made this
bill more vulnerable than H.R. 354 to a facial First Amendment challenge.); Collection of
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) (Designed broadly to protect
investment in databases against unauthorized uses that cause material harm, it prohibited
the unauthorized use of “all or a substantial part” of a protected database. The bill
contained exceptions for news reporting use and for scientific, educational, and research
uses. It also contained general exception for fair use and a limited term of protection.).
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Rural’s brow and thus no free riding by Feist. Whereas in the past,
creating a “white pages” directory was a labor-intensive mission,
requiring lots of people with file cards to handle, assemble, and
check individual phone listings,79 today’s phone information is
digital. In the digital era, telephone companies are not engaged in
the same labor-intensive task for creating telephone directories.
Such directories can easily be created based on the companies’
client data.80 Therefore, Feist did not really involve “sweat of the
brow” or human effort as historically understood.81 Additionally,
the Feist case did not exemplify the classical free rider scenario.
The classical free rider scenario assumes that late-comers use
authors’ work product without paying the authors, thus benefitting
from their work without sharing the authors’ production costs. In
Feist, Feist actually licensed ten out of the eleven telephone
directories and clearly attempted to license Rural’s directory rather
than copy it for free.82
The second problem lies in the fact that the data at issue in
Feist was generated by a government-created monopolist (Rural),
which was required by law to produce this information but refused
to license it.83 State-licensed monopolies such as Rural do not
require incentives to create directories since there are mandatory
requirements to produce such information as well as the possibility
of revenue received from advertising or other readily available
business models.84 In fact, even if no possibility of advertising
revenue existed, and certainly before the rise of the Internet,
consumers would probably be willing to pay for the production of
phone books.
It is important to emphasize that in the
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Congress solved Feist’s holdout

79

Symposium, Panel I: Database Protection, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 275, 296 (2001); see also Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g
Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S.
581 (1922) (upholding copyright protection in a compilation of the names and addresses
of jewelers which “was the result of considerable past labor” by the compiler-plaintiff
and which featured “original illustrations made by the plaintiff.”).
80
See Panel I: Database Protection, supra note 79, at 296.
81
Id.
82
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 342.
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problem regarding telephone subscribers’ information by requiring
telecommunication carriers to provide non-discriminatory access to
telephone numbers and directory listings,85 thereby ensuring that
such information remain accessible to others.
Third, the Feist Court dealt with the easiest type of directory: a
white pages directory, organized in alphabetical order, lacking
minimal creativity.86 The nature of the case thus made the need to
provide guidelines regarding creativity in compilations extraneous
to the holding, a fact that has since proven to be one of the major
weaknesses of the decision. For example, soon after the Court
decided Feist, a series of cases “pop[ped] up throughout the federal
circuit” courts that seemed especially suited to follow from the
precedent set in Feist.87 “However, the stability and clarity that the
Court seemed to promise proved to be short-lived”88 because while
factually similar, different circuits decided those cases
differently.89 Thus, while the Court’s decision in Feist did succeed
in ending the split among circuit courts regarding the continued
viability of the industrious collection doctrine, the Court created
ambiguity as to the exact standard of originality required for
copyright protection for selection and arrangement of information
in fact works.90 The result: continued division and uncertainty
regarding the copyrightability of compilations.
Fourth, by holding that “obvious” selection and arrangement is
not copyrightable,91 the Court implicitly introduced uncertainty as
85

Telecommunication Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222(e) (2006).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (“Given that
some works must fail [copyright’s minimal creativity test], we cannot imagine a more
likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard
to believe that any collection of facts could fail.”).
87
Ethan R. York, Note, Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.: Continuing
the Stable Uncertainty of Copyright in Factual Compilations, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
565, 565 (1999).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 585 (arguing that while Feist may have “ended ‘the seventy year split among
circuits’ concerning sweat of the brow versus creative selection/arrangement theory, the
Court may have created a new seventy year split by not providing further clarification in
the standards of originality it proclaimed” (quoting Tracy Lea Meade, Ex-Post Feist:
Application of a Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 251–52
(1994))).
91
Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
86
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to the level of copyright protection available to fact works which
demonstrate less obvious selection and arrangement. Indeed, Feist
suggests that the work’s copyright status is dynamic rather than
static and that over time a fact work can become an industry
standard or convention, and as a result, might lose its protection.
For example, the first creator of a telephone directory could have
been perceived as an author of an original work of authorship by
organizing her compilation in an original way not known or used
before. However, over time, with the widespread adoption of
alphabetically organized telephone directories, such organization
became an industry standard.
One can imagine a new
copyrightable organization or selection for fact works being found
unoriginal during its lifetime.
Fifth and last, the Court failed to articulate what is considered a
“fact” and why telephone subscribers’ information is factual in
nature. The Court’s failure to address these seemingly basic and
simple questions created many problems later on as the following
discussion will demonstrate.
II. FEIST’S PROGENY
The ambiguous decision thus left some, including members of
the information industry, unsatisfied. They argued that while the
Court’s decision in Feist established that originality in selection
and arrangement precludes copying but does not preclude using the
underlying factual materials of compilations,92 they were still left
with no meaningful copyright protection since “mechanical”
selection and arrangement are insufficient to meet the creativity
requirement.93 Indeed, the Court’s analysis did fail to provide
92

See id. at 349–350 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985)).
93
See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak
Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1343, 1374–75 (“[T]here is no particular reason to think that the creative selection
approach directs copyright to compilations whose production genuinely requires
encouragement. If anything, it would seem that the sweat theory, which the Court
rejected, is better related to the need for encouragement because the amount of a
compiler’s labor bears some relationship to the size of development costs. Significant
sweat would imply large development costs, which in turn would suggest that a compiler
would face difficulty in recouping those costs. This realization exposes as questionable
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guidelines for evaluating whether a compilation meets the original
selection and arrangement test, leaving such decisions to the lower
courts. Accordingly, lower courts were left with two critical
unanswered questions: what constitutes creativity in selection and
arrangement, and, assuming that this threshold is met, what sort of
copying does it prevent? Courts’ decisions following Feist provide
answers to these questions.
Since I have discussed the arguments regarding the need for
copyright protection in fact works elsewhere,94 the focus of this
Article is limited to an assessment of the strength of copyright
protection for compilations under the above-mentioned creativity
standard in selection and arrangement within post-Feist case law.
The discussion closely examines this case law by first distilling the
standards that were developed regarding the selection and
arrangement test. It describes the courts’ search for creative
selection based on either the subjective decisions involved in
determining the compilations’ criteria or the conscious exclusion
from the compilation of some data that meets the objective criteria
of the compilation. It also explores the courts’ struggle to define a
creative arrangement standard based on data’s arrangement in a
non-mechanical or subjective manner.
The discussion then deals with the courts’ struggles in applying
these tests (and Feist’s proscription of copyright protection in facts
themselves)95 to define the “fact,” “idea,” and “expression” of
compilations.96 Professor Ginsburg has argued that the definitions

any assertion that the creative selection approach’s application to factual compilations
strongly promotes “the progress of Science and useful Arts.” (citations omitted)); see
generally Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database
Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93 (2006) [hereinafter Bitton, A New Outlook].
94
See generally id.
95
See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d
700 (2d Cir. 1991); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509
(2d Cir. 1991).
96
See, e.g., Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346 (“In copyright law, an ‘idea’ is
not an epistemological concept, but a legal conclusion prompted by notions—often
unarticulated and unproven—of appropriate competition. Thus, copyright doctrine
attaches the label ‘idea’ to aspects of works which, if protected, would (or, we fear,
might) preclude, or render too expensive, subsequent authors’ endeavors.”).
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of the above terms were based on public policy considerations.97
Such considerations, she claims, reflected an attempt to draw a
proper balance between incentives to create and access the
building blocks of future works.98 This Article suggests that a
careful, closer examination of these cases reveals that many of
these decisions were wrongly decided and are a source of concern.
Though purporting to follow Feist’s legacy and provide greater
access to materials constituting building blocks of knowledge via
newly created distinctions between different kinds of facts, these
cases instead seem to exhibit disloyalty to the holding and spirit of
Feist, providing protection to works that do not meet Feist’s
threshold of creativity, and introducing uncertainty and
incoherence to copyright law jurisprudence.99
The discussion concludes with an introduction to and a
description of the new and improved “intent test” for identification
of unprotectable “facts” and “ideas” and protectable “expression”
in compilations. The scope of copying that is prevented under the
creative selection and arrangement standard is also explored and
the application of the standard and its scope of protection as
formulated by the courts regarding electronic databases is
examined.

97

Id.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997). Discussing
the Second Circuit’s distinction between types of ideas, the author suggests that, for the
court, a “soft” idea is one whose privatization by copyright is tolerable because it “do[es]
not materially assist the understanding of future thinkers. The court has come close to
acknowledging that an idea in copyright law is not an epistemological concept; it is a
legal conclusion informed by public policy notions of what is necessary to stimulate
creations of works in the first place, while still leaving room for subsequent innovation.”
Id. at 153–54 (quoting CCC, 44 F.3d at 71).
99
Subjective is defined as “[p]roceeding from or taking place within an individual’s
mind and unaffected by the outside world.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 677
(1983). Because these decisions are based on functional considerations, they are
certainly affected by the outside world and are not subjective.
98
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A. The Creative Selection and Arrangement Standard
1. Development of the Standard in Courts’ Decisions
Examination of major decisions in both the Second and
Eleventh Circuits show that these courts and others that followed
them required the compiler to have made subjective decisions in
compiling the directory in order to meet Feist’s creativity
threshold.100 Standards that search for subjective elements attempt
to identify the “person” in the work, meaning the elements of a
work that stem from a person. Thus creative selection requires
showing either the presence of subjective decisions in determining
the criteria of the compilation or conscious exclusion from the
compilation of some data that meets the objective criteria of the
compilation.101 Similarly, creative arrangement requires the
compiler to arrange data in a subjective or non-mechanical
manner.102
The underlying assumptions of the “subjective
decisions” standards are that works whose facts are selected or
arranged in an objective manner do not reflect their creator’s
personality and, even if one assumed that they did, objective
selection or arrangement criteria permit the facts in the works at
issue to be expressed in only a very limited number of ways.103

100

See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Eckes v. Card Prices
Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding the exercise of judgment in
selecting a set of “premium” baseball cards worthy of copyright protection); see also 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[B] (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2010) (examining opinions which found originality in selection and
emphasizing the necessity of “subjective judgment”); Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1896 (describing selection and arrangement as “a
test of subjective authorship”); Jack B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases:
Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1987) (noting
that “under the subjective selection standard expression is found in the actions taken to
collect information” (emphasis added)).
101
1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[B]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (noting that “the requisite originality may inhere in
selection or arrangement alone, even if the other ingredient is lacking”).
102
See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen it comes to the selection or arrangement of information, creativity
inheres in making non-obvious choices from among more than a few options.”).
103
See, e.g., Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 513.
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This leads to the application of the merger doctrine and results in
the denial of copyright protection for such works.104 “Subjective
decisions” standards also assume that providing protection to
objectively dictated selection and arrangement of factual
compilations provides, in practice, protection to the least valuable
elements of the work.
Loyalty to such standards and their underlying assumptions
would keep the most valuable aspects of the work free for use by
all. However, courts’ decisions in applying these standards,
oftentimes providing protection to works that should not have been
protected, illustrate their failure to understand Feist’s underlying
rationales. The Second Circuit’s decision in Key Publications, Inc.
v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,105 which provided
protection to a classified business directory used by New York
City’s Chinese-American community,106 and the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing, Inc.107 which denied protection to a yellow
pages directory, provide excellent examples of two cases with
identical factual scenarios that were decided differently.
In Key Publications, the Second Circuit examined whether
defendant Galore infringed plaintiff Key’s classified business
directory intended for use by New York City’s Chinese-American

104

See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
106
Id. at 512.
107
999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the selection of factual information in a title commitment
did not merit copyright protection since the selection of facts to include was not a matter
of discretion grounded in the title company’s personal judgment or taste, but was dictated
by convention and industry standards. Title examiners had to list all of the facts that
could affect the marketability of a title); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that a list of dental procedures did not
constitute a creatively original selection because no selection can be discerned when the
list was intended to be comprehensive); Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing
Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that a publisher of a
legal directory “did not exercise even a minimal degree of creativity in a Feistian sense”
in selecting only actively practicing Massachusetts attorneys and in omitting those who
were retired or suspended and in selecting other information in the directory, such as
attorney name, address, telephone, and fax numbers since such information was not
original but was rather “determined by forces external to the compiler”).
105
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community.108 Noting that original selection involves judgment in
choosing what from a body of data to include in a compilation,109
108

Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 512.
Id. at 513; see also Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding
creative selection in the words included in a book since the plaintiff selected the words
included in his book from numerous variations of hundreds of available terms in fifteenth
century works based on subjective, informed, and creative judgment); Eckes v. Card
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding selectivity in the designation of
5,000 cards as “premium” from among 18,000 baseball cards); Nester’s Map & Guide
Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding creative
selection in the selections of both street address listings and out-of-town destinations in a
New York City taxi driver’s guide since the plaintiff showed creativity in assigning
approximate numbers to building addresses at chosen intersections and used its
knowledge and judgment in making its choice regarding specific useful out-of-town
destinations); Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding
creative selection in the selection of data contained in tables in a copyrighted book on
Medicaid planning since the plaintiff chose relevant data from the Governor’s Report and
discarded what he felt was unnecessary). Also, see the following cases which went along
the same line of analysis: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674
(2d Cir. 1998) (“Bender I”) and Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158
F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Bender II”). In both cases the Second Circuit denied copyright
protection to the selection and arrangement of many of West’s case reports. In Bender I,
the defendant published HyperLaw, a CD-ROM compilation of federal decisions. 158
F.3d at 677. It copied the text of the opinions from West, but deleted West’s syllabi,
headnotes, and key numbers. Id. at 677–78. Hyperlaw, however, did copy other
enhancement features that West typically adds to the judicial texts: information about
parties, counsel, court, and date of decision; annotations about subsequent procedural
developments; and the editing of parallel citations in the reported cases to ensure
uniformity of style. Id. at 678. West argued that each enhancement feature reflected
creative choices. Id. at 681. The Second Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court’s
grant of declaratory relief to HyperLaw. Id. at 689. The court held that all of the
information was factual in nature, and that the information was not compiled or arranged
with even the minimal creativity required by Feist. Id. at 685. On the contrary, every
decision that West made about format or arrangement was dictated by convention. Id. at
677. While West’s work “entails considerable scholarly labor and care,” the court
observed, “creativity in the task of creating a useful case report can only proceed in a
narrow groove.” Id. at 688. But see West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d
1219 (8th Cir. 1986) where West had established a compilation copyright in the
arrangement of cases in its National Reporter System; Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996) in which the court upheld the court’s rulings in
the pre-Feist case discussed above. In Bender II, however, the Second Circuit rejected
claims identical to those that had been endorsed in Oasis and the earlier Mead Data
decisions. The court held that a work that simply permits a user “to re-arrange the
material into the copyrightholder’s arrangement,” does not amount to an infringing
copy—an issue never addressed in Oasis. Bender II, 158 F.3d at 702. Bender could not
be charged with contributory infringement because West had failed to identify any
primary infringer. Finally, the court criticized the Oasis, Mead Data notion that a work
109
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the court held that the plaintiff’s exclusion of businesses that it did
not think would remain open very long was sufficiently original.110
However, this exclusion does not seem to be truly subjective since
the plaintiff’s decision was the result of purely functional
considerations—the plaintiff wanted to provide consumers with a
directory that included only relevant, useful data.111
The court examined whether the plaintiff’s work exhibited
creative arrangement, explaining that original “[a]rrangement
‘refers to the ordering or grouping of data into lists or categories
that go beyond the mere mechanical grouping of data as such, for
example, the alphabetical, chronological, or sequential listings of
data.’”112 Applying this standard in Key Publications, the court
wrongly concluded that while Key’s directory was in a format
“common to most classified directories,”113 its “arrangement [was]
in no sense mechanical, but involved creativity on the part of [the
plaintiff] in deciding which categories to include and under what
name.”114
However, functional considerations dictate both the decisions
regarding which categories to include and under what headings.
Producers of such business directories usually make such decisions
based on the intuitiveness of such choices to consumers. They use
conventional, accepted—and thus, predictable—categories so
consumers can easily find the information they seek.115 Therefore,
which can supplant the original, is by definition, a copy. These cases, the Second Circuit
held, have no basis, other than the defunct “sweat of the brow” doctrine. Bender II, 158
F.3d at 708.
110
See Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d
Cir. 1991).
111
Id. In this context I consider “functional” considerations to constitute objective
rather than subjective selection because the compiler has no real choice in making such
decisions.
112
Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRATION OF FACTBASED COMPILATIONS 1 (Rev. Oct. 11, 1989)).
113
Id. at 514.
114
Id.
115
See Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1868 n.13
(arguing that the “[p]ersonality-based characterizations of many [factual compilations]
seem contrived”). In Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., the Seventh Circuit, a sweat
of the brow court before Feist, clearly invoked the sweat of the brow doctrine in the guise
of originality after Feist. 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). The court held that the ingredient
lists in recipes contained in a cookbook holding a compilation copyright were not
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while the court found originality in the compiler’s work, the case
can easily be made that such “originality” was dictated by purely
functional considerations, suggesting essentially that the directory
was organized based on objective criteria and thus should not have
been protectable.
In contrast to Key Publications, the Eleventh Circuit, in its
decision in Bellsouth, found no original selection and arrangement
in a yellow pages directory, seeming to understand the flaws in
such an approach.116 In Bellsouth, the court held that the
defendant’s entry into a computer of all of the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of advertisers in the plaintiff’s yellow
pages telephone directory, together with business type and type of
advertisement, did not constitute copyright infringement.117
The court’s analysis focused on the question of whether the
plaintiff’s selection, coordination, and arrangement, which the
plaintiff claimed were infringed, were protectable and copied by

protectable because they were statements of fact. Furthermore, the directions for
combining ingredients were not protectable because they were procedures and processes.
Discussing the basic principles of compilation copyright, the court cited Feist for the
proposition that “[t]he creative energies that an author may independently devote to the
arrangement or compilation of facts may warrant copyright protection for that particular
compilation.” Id. at 480. This proposition focuses on the effort involved in creating the
compilation, not the creativity of the result. Furthermore, the court stated “a
compilation’s originality flows from the efforts of ‘industrious collection’ by its author.”
Id. For this principle, the court cited Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., which in turn
cited Jeweler’s Circular Publishing, the seminal case describing the sweat of the brow
theory. Id.; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 140 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that creativity in constructing maps arose from verifying preexisting maps generated by
the U.S. Geological Survey); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Execs. Unlimited, Inc., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 2049 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit, an “unaligned” circuit before Feist,
held that U.S. Payphone’s guidebook to the coin-operated telephone market was
copyrightable. Id. at 2051. The district court had found that “the Guide . . . [was] the
result of hundreds of hours of reviewing, analyzing, and interpreting state tariffs and
regulations of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.” Id. at 2050. In addition, the
court noted, “Payphone produced 2700 pages of documents relating to the review,
selection, coordination and arrangement of the compiled data which ultimately it
organized in a ‘simple and readable format’ of fifty-one pages.” Id. Based on these
findings, the appellate court held that Payphone’s selection and organization of the
material met the minimal standard for creative originality enunciated in Feist. Id. at 2051.
116
See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1993).
117
Id. at 1442.
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the defendant. The court found that the plaintiff’s selection of
listings by establishing a closing date for changes, determining the
geographic scope of the directory, and limiting listings to
subscribers of its business telephone service did not meet the
creativity threshold required by Feist.118 Such a decision perhaps
resulted from an understanding that the above elements were all
functional considerations that do not entail any subjectivity.
Moreover, the court did not consider these elements to be “acts of
authorship, but techniques for the discovery of facts.”119
Accordingly, the court concluded, these elements were not entitled
to copyright protection since “protection of copyright must inhere
in a creatively original selection of facts to be reported and not in
the creative means used to discover those facts.”120
As for the directory’s arrangement, the court found it to be
unoriginal and to have merged with the idea of a business directory
since it was “in an alphabetized list of business types, with
individual businesses listed in alphabetical order under the
applicable headings.”121 However, since there was insufficient
evidence to establish that the defendant copied the headings used
in the plaintiff’s directory, the court did not rule on their
protectability.122
Similarly, in Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple
Inc.,123 the Second Circuit did not extend copyright protection to a
publisher of charts comprised of the “lucky numbers” derived from
gambling operations.124 In that case, the plaintiff published a chart
that contained winning numbers that were determined by gambling
activity at local racetracks; the numbers were the last three digits

118

Id. at 1441.
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1442.
122
Id. at 1444; see also Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. v. Dunhill Int’l List Co., Inc., No. 886767-CIV(NCR), 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21485, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1993) (relying
on Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., the court held that defendant’s copying of all the
names and addresses of lawyers in the plaintiff’s directory, together with certain
“correlating data” (attorney specialization, title, firm composition and structure) was not
infringing since those elements were all unprotectable facts).
123
936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
124
Id. at 673.
119
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of the total sum of money bet each day at New York racetracks for
the previous thirteen months.125 The numbers were displayed in a
grid with the months of the year in a row across the top of the chart
and the days of the month, from one to thirty-one, in a vertical
column.126 There were numerous publishers of such charts.127 The
numbers were computed according to a formula that was standard
in that industry so the information presented in competing charts
did not vary at all.128 The court held that the plaintiff’s selection,
coordination, and arrangement of these numbers failed to meet the
creativity requirement129 since the plaintiff arranged the factual
data into “purely functional grids that offer[ed] no opportunity for
variation,”130 and as such, like Rural’s listings, were considered to
be “‘mechanical,’ ‘typical,’ and ‘garden variety,’” and, hence, not
protectable.131
Likewise, in Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc.,132 the court
found that a decision to publish a collection of all of Dorothy
Parker’s unpublished poetry did not reflect the compiler’s
creativity in the selection process because it employed an objective
criterion for determining which poems to include.133 Because there
was only one way to publish the complete collection of the poet’s
unpublished works, the court reasoned, the compilation was
uncopyrightable.134 Therefore, when exhaustive, a compilation is
automatically denied protection.
The court also rejected
Silverstein’s contention that he had to use his subjective judgment
to determine what was or was not a poem holding that
“Silverstein’s choices were obvious ones that required no
125

Id. at 672.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 673.
130
Victor Lalli Enters., Inc., 936 F.2d at 673.
131
Id.; see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346
(5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that Feist’s definition of originality suggests that a work can
be original when there are other ways of expression or products available in the market
and holding that the work was original because there were other structural engineering
programs available in the market).
132
522 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
133
Id. at 599.
134
Id. (“[T]he collection of all is not a selection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126
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subjective judgment.”135 By contrast, in Bensbargains.net, LLC v.
XPBargains.com,136 the court suggested that when the selection
criteria is not select all, but rather there exists some selection
criteria that excludes some information, then it is likely that
originality will be found.137 In this case, carefully selecting deals
to include on a website led the court to hold that the compilation of
the deals on the plaintiff’s website was creative.138
Lastly, in Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.,139
the Eleventh Circuit held plaintiff Warren’s directory of cable
television systems and their owners to be non-copyrightable and
not infringed.140 The defendant, Microdos, marketed an electronic
database of information on the cable television industry called the
“Factbook.”141
Warren claimed infringement as to the
communities chosen and as to its designation of “lead community”
to indicate the primary community served by a given cable
operator where that operator served multiple communities.142 The
district court found that “the selection of . . . communities was
creative and protectable because Warren use[d] a unique system in
selecting the communities that [would] be represented in the
Factbook.”143
Reversing the District Court, the Eleventh Circuit held that, to
the extent that the district court was correct in characterizing
Warren’s claim as relating to a system of selecting communities,
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act would bar protection since the
statute expressly excludes “any . . . system” from copyright

135

Silverstein, 522 F. Supp. 2d 579, 599–600 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
2007 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 60544 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007).
137
Id. at *16.
138
Id. at *7.
139
115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
140
Id. at 1513. But see York, supra note 88, at 588 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit
reached the wrong result in Warren since it relied on a several rationales that are
inconsistent with Feist and copyright law in general and created too high of a standard for
originality).
141
Warren Publ’g, 115 F.3d at 1511.
142
Id. at 1512. Warren had also claimed infringement as to the data fields and the data
field entries, but the district court found that Microdos had not infringed the data field
format and that the data field entries were unprotectable fields. Id. at 113–14.
143
Id. at 1516 (citation omitted).
136
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protection “regardless of the form in which it is . . . embodied.”144
Even if Warren’s selection process was not a “system” within the
meaning of the statute, the court held, Warren’s selection was not
original and thus non-protectable.145 The Eleventh Circuit found
that Warren “did not exercise any creativity or judgment in
‘selecting’ cable systems to include in its Factbook, but rather
included the entire relevant universe known to it,” thus employing
objective, rather than subjective, selection criteria.146 As to the
selection of principal communities, the court held that since
Warren made this determination by contacting cable operators and
asking them for information regarding their classification, “the
selection [was] not its own, but rather that of the cable
operators.”147
In another line of cases, courts suggested that the question
whether an arrangement or selection is not creative under Feist is
dictated by the question of whether it is “obvious.” If found to be
obvious, courts have suggested that the selection and arrangement
are not copyrightable. In determining whether a selection is
obvious—and thus analogous to the plaintiff’s telephone book in
Feist—courts explored whether it was possible to arrange the work
in different ways and whether those selections and arrangements
followed industry standards or conventions.148 When found to
follow industry standards or conventions, courts usually decided
that protection was not warranted, given the scarcity of forms of
expression for selection or arrangement.

144

Id. at 1517 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).
Id.
146
Id. at 1518.
147
Id. at 1519.
148
See, e.g., Carmichael Lodge No. 2103 v. Leonard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84857, at
*36 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2009) (holding “even when multiple options for selection or
arrangement are available, the choice from among those options must be non-obvious in
order to be protectable”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387
F.3d 522, 536–37 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that Feist is used to show that although a work
may be set up in many different ways, the possible different ways must also be feasible);
Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a selection of a
factual compilation regarding a residential parcel of land was not copyrightable because
the selection was a matter of following convention and strict industry standards).
145
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In summary, after Feist, some courts approach the question of
original arrangement and selection of a database with caution,
suggesting that when the selection or arrangement is dictated by
functional considerations or where the criteria for selection or
organization are objective, copyright protection will be denied.
However, some other courts failed to follow Feist’s underlying
policies and as a result, have afforded copyright protection to
compilations when not warranted.
2. Courts’ Search for the “Idea,” “Fact,” and “Expression” of
Compilations
The general idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy and
its corollary, the merger doctrine, are applicable to databases as
well.149 The idea/expression and the fact/expression dichotomy are
doctrines of copyright law, providing that “[n]o author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”150 These doctrines
reflect the balance that copyright law seeks to achieve between
encouraging authors to create new works by protecting their
original creations from unauthorized copying, while at the same
time, preserving the basic building blocks of facts and ideas for the
public domain so that others may use them to create new works.151
Thus, if protection for a database would prevent others from using
the database’s ideas or underlying facts, the idea/expression
dichotomy will be applicable.152 And, if there are a limited
149

The question of what constitute “facts” for purposes of copyright law has been
discussed in some cases and in the academic literature. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc.
v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that fictitious facts are
considered expression); Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of
Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007).
150
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
151
See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 560, 560 (1982).
152
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991) (“Facts,
whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be
copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original
selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or
arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.”). The Feist
Court, however, never discussed the problem of protecting a factual compilation’s
underlying idea. However, in Baker v. Selden, the Court held that copying an idea
without copying its expression does not constitute infringement. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See
also Mazer v. Stein, 437 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
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number of means to express the database’s ideas, then courts apply
the merger doctrine and decline to extend copyright protection to
the database.153
In 1991, the Second Circuit considered the applicability of
these two doctrines to the protection of databases in Kregos v.
Associated Press.154 In Kregos the court found the idea of an
“outcome predictive pitching form” for baseball not to have
merged with its expression: the form at issue in the case.155 This
finding resulted in the reversal of a grant of summary judgment
against the compiler, Kregos, and the case was remanded for trial
on the question of whether his pitching form met the required
creativity standard.156
Kregos, the compiler and plaintiff, created a baseball pitching
form distributed to newspapers that displayed information about
past performance of the opposing pitchers scheduled to start each
day’s baseball game.157 The plaintiff’s form listed nine items of
information about each pitcher’s past performance to assist
newspaper readers in predicting the outcomes of future games.158
The plaintiff argued that his compilation was “an outcome
predictive pitching form” in that he selected pitching statistics that
he thought were the most important to newspaper readers when
they were making their predictions on the games.159 The district
court held for the defendants, ruling that the pitching form lacked
sufficient originality in its selection of statistics to be copyrightable
as a compilation and that there were so few ways of selecting

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[D] (1990). The doctrine was eventually codified by the
Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
153
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “even
expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection
to the idea itself”); see also Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir.
1986); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
154
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); id. at 705.
155
Id. at 705–07; see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d
408, 409 (5th Cir. 1995).
156
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 711.
157
Id. at 702.
158
Id.
159
Id.
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pitching statistics that the pitching form’s idea merged with its
expression and was thus rendered uncopyrightable.160
The Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that, as a
matter of law, Kregos’s selection of pitching statistics could not be
rejected for lack of originality and creativity.161 The court
concluded that because an ample variety of ways to express the
idea of rating a pitcher’s performance were rejected by Kregos in
assembling his form, the merger doctrine did not apply.162
The court started its opinion by warning that the merger
doctrine must be applied with caution, explaining that if applied
too readily, the doctrine denies protection to protectable forms of
expression, while if applied too sparingly the doctrine protects
ideas.163 The court acknowledged that the application of the
merger doctrine always depends on the level of abstraction at
which the idea is stated.164 Moreover, the court explained that a
reviewing court should exercise particular caution when applying
the merger doctrine to compilations of facts because the idea of the
compilation could always be defined as its particular selection of
facts thus merging the idea into the compiler’s expression of it.165
Such an application, in effect, eliminates copyright protection for

160

Id. at 703.
Id. at 704–05.
162
Id. at 707.
163
See id. at 705. Thus, “courts have been cautious in applying the merger doctrine to
selections of factual information.” Id.; see Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d
533, 540 (finding the doctrine inapplicable to the selection of test questions); Toro Co. v.
R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (finding the doctrine inapplicable to selection of
data for numbering parts). However, it “has been applied on occasion to selections of
categories of data.” Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer
Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the
plaintiff’s categories of data concerning personal injury awards were “the only sensible
ones which could have been used to compile the data”).
164
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706.
165
Id. at 706 (“In one sense, every compilation of facts can be considered to represent a
merger of an idea with its expression. Every compiler of facts has the idea that his
particular selection of facts is useful. If the compiler’s idea is identified at that low level
of abstraction, then the idea would always merge into the compiler’s expression of it.
Under that approach, there could never be a copyrightable compilation of facts.”).
161
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compilations.166 Thus, the more generally one defines an idea, the
less likely it is that the doctrine of merger will apply.167
In order to prevent such a result and to justify the boundary the
court had drawn between idea and expression, the court offered an
alternative view of the doctrine of merger. The court drew a
distinction between selections based on “matters of taste and
personal opinion” and those that are “the first step in an analysis
that yields a precise result.”168 Protection of the former imposes
little risk that an idea will be protected while protection of the
latter imposes significant risk that protection of ideas will occur.169
Examples of the former include the selection of “premium”
baseball cards170 or the selection of prominent families to include
in a social directory.171 As an example of the latter, the court
presented a hypothetical doctor who publishes a list of symptoms
useful in diagnosing a disease.172 Where the selection amounts to a
system yielding a precise result (i.e., the diagnosis of a disease),
the court recommended that the idea of the selection be formulated
at a low level of abstraction.173 Thus, the idea of the doctor’s
selection may be defined as the specific idea that this particular
group of symptoms identifies a particular disease.174 Defined in so
specific a manner, no other way to express that specific idea may
exist and, as a result, the idea merges with the expression.175
Where the selection is based on taste or personal opinion, however,
the court recommended a more general formulation of the idea of
the selection, such that alternative expressions will always be
possible and the merger doctrine will not apply.176
Applying this distinction between types of selections of facts to
Kregos’s pitching form, the court found that his pitching statistics
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.; see also Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346–47.
Kregos , 937 F.2d at 707.
See id.
Id.
See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
See Social Register Ass’n v. Murphy, 128 F. 116 (D.R.I. 1904).
See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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selection was somewhere in between pure taste and predictive
analysis.177 Accordingly, the court decided that the plaintiff’s
selection of the nine pitching-performance characteristics included
on his form was less than a complete system for weighing each
performance characteristic—that is, less than a system, method or
process for determining each team’s probability of winning—but
was also more than merely his personal opinion of which
performance characteristics were “most pertinent.”178 Thus,
because the form differed enough from a system that determined
outcomes to warrant treatment as a selection reflecting Kregos’s
own personal taste, the court did not apply the merger doctrine.179
The pitching form was, therefore, held to be protectable by
copyright.180
In CCC Information Services, Inc., v. Maclean Hunter Market
Reports, Inc.181 the Second Circuit drew additional and even more
significant distinctions between different types of selections of
facts and further complicated its idea/expression and merger
tests.182 CCC concerned the question of copyrightability of the
predicted values for used cars in different regions of the country,
published eight times a year by Maclean Hunter Market Reports,
Inc. in its Automobile Red Book—Official Used Car Valuations
(“Red Book”).183 CCC, a computer service, copied substantial
portions of the Red Book onto its computer network and provided

177

See Id.
Id. (“Kregos has been content to select categories of data that he obviously believes
have some predictive power, but has left it to all sports page readers to make their own
judgments as to the likely outcomes from the sets of data he has selected.”).
179
Id. at 707.
180
Id.
181
44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).
182
Id.; see also CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). Analogously, in
this case, plaintiff CDN published The Coin Dealer Newsletter containing projected
collectable coin valuations, which were derived from a variety of factors by expertise and
judgment. Id. at 1260. CDN alleged that Kapes used its wholesale prices as a baseline to
arrive at the retail price on its Internet site, and in so doing infringed CDN’s copyright.
Id. at 1258. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that CDN’s coin prices, like the car values at
issue in CCC, were the result of extrapolation and judgment. Id. at 1261. Accordingly,
the court held that CDN’s values were not merely facts, but original creations that were
subject to copyright protection. Id.
183
CCC, 44 F.3d at 63.
178
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information from it in different forms to its customers.184 CCC
tried unsuccessfully to obtain a license from Maclean to include
Red Book values in its on-line services.185 Despite Maclean’s
refusal, CCC proceeded to use the Red Book valuations, updating
its figures regularly as new editions of the Red Book were
published.186 CCC filed suit against Maclean seeking a declaratory
judgment that its use of the Red Book’s used car valuations did not
constitute copyright infringement.187 Maclean, the publisher,
counterclaimed, alleging that CCC’s use of the Red Book
valuations constituted copyright infringement.188
The district court found for CCC. The court held that the Red
Book’s selection, arrangement, and coordination of data lacked
sufficient originality to be protected as an “original work of
authorship.”189 The court also held that the Red Book’s used car
valuations “were facts, or interpretations of facts, and were,
therefore, not protected by copyright.”190 Lastly, the court held
that even if the valuations were not facts, the doctrine of merger
prevented their protection191 since each Red Book valuation was an
idea—the idea of the value of a particular used car—that could be
expressed in only one way: by the dollar figure listed in the Red
Book.192
Maclean appealed, seeking to prove that CCC infringed its
copyright in the Red Book.193 The Second Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling, holding that the Red Book was sufficiently
original to warrant copyright protection, both in its underlying
data—the used car valuations themselves—and as a compilation.194
184

Id. at 64.
Id. at 64 n.3.
186
Id. at 64.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 64 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. (“[E]ven if the entries were not facts, copyright protection was nonetheless
precluded by the doctrine of ‘merger of idea and expression,’ because each entry in the
Red Book is an idea—the idea of the value of the particular vehicle—and that idea is
necessarily communicated by a dollar figure.”).
193
Id. at 63.
194
Id. at 67.
185
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Moreover, the court held that the merger doctrine should have been
“withheld,”195 concluding that Maclean had demonstrated both a
valid copyright in the Red Book and an infringement of it by
CCC.196
The court found sufficient originality in the selection and
arrangement of data to protect the Red Book as a compilation.197
Such originality was found in the following aspects of the Red
Book: (1) division of the national used car market into several
regions, (2) adjustment of mileage by five-thousand-mile
increments, (3) choice of which optional features on used cars to
include, (4) use of the “average” vehicle as the basis for valuation
in each category, and (5) selection of the number of models per
year to include.198 Even if the Red Book was not original as a
compilation of data, the court implied that it was “an original work
of authorship” because its data reflected creative judgments of its
editors and were not pre-existing facts at all.199 The Red Book
valuations were, instead, found to be predictions based on the
professional opinions of Maclean’s editors and not reports of
historical prices (considered facts), nor mechanical derivations of
historical prices (also considered facts).200 The court’s distinction
between invented or created facts—the used car valuations—and
historically or mechanically derived facts, suggests the implicit
adoption of Kregos’s distinction between mechanically selected
facts and facts which are selected based on subjective opinion.201

195

Id. at 72.
Id. at 74.
197
Id. at 67 (“We find that the selection and arrangement of data in the Red Book
displayed amply sufficient originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn
copyright protection.”).
198
Id.
199
Id. (“The valuations themselves are original creations of Maclean.”). The court
pointed out in a footnote that even though these valuations were just numbers, their
numerical form is “immaterial to originality. Original authorship warranting protection
may be ‘fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . includ[ing ] . . . literary works.’ .
. . The Act broadly defines literary works to include ‘works, other than audiovisual
works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols . . . .’” Id. at
67 n.6 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)).
200
Id. at 67.
201
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
196
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Deciding that, either way, the Red Book demonstrated enough
originality to merit copyright protection, the court proceeded to
evaluate and ultimately reject CCC’s and the district court’s
application of the idea/expression and merger doctrines. Instead,
the court relied on the distinction laid out in Kregos.202
Understanding the potential risks in application of the
idea/expression and merger doctrines to the explicit protection
given to compilations under § 103 of the 1976 Act,203 the court
emphasized that the level of abstraction could always be adjusted
in a manner such that the idea of the compilation is defined as its
particular selection, arrangement, and coordination.204 Such a
definition would necessarily result in merger of the idea and the
particular expression in the compilation.205 Therefore, the court
interpreted the Kregos distinction more broadly, as one between
types of ideas, some more susceptible to merger than others,206 and
not as one between types of selections of facts. The court stated
that the merger doctrine should apply to those ideas that
“undertake to advance the understanding of phenomena or the
solution of problems,”207 like the hypothetical doctor’s
identification of symptoms for disease diagnosis. These ideas are
the “more important and useful kind,”208 constituting “building
blocks of understanding”209 or “hard” ideas. The court contrasted
these hard ideas with “soft” ideas to which the merger doctrine
should not apply. These “soft” ideas “do not materially assist the
understanding of future thinkers,”210 and are usually “infused with
the author’s taste or opinion.”211 Soft ideas are “weaker,” and they
“explain nothing, and describe no method, process, or
procedure.”212
202

See CCC, 44 F.3d at 70–73.
See id. at 70 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2005)); see also Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706;
Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346.
204
See CCC, 44 F.3d at 70.
205
See id. at 70–71; see also Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346.
206
See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 71.
212
Id. at 72–73.
203
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The court found support for this distinction between types of
ideas in the language of § 102(b) of the 1976 Act, which denies
copyright protection to any “idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”213 The
court seemed to read this section as capturing the “building blocks”
theory. Although § 102(b) does not specifically define “idea,” the
court read this section of the statute to suggest congressional intent
to deny copyright protection to the “building block” type of idea
that explains a process or discovery.214 The court read the same
dichotomized notion of “idea” into a Copyright Office circular and
a copyright regulation215 and supported this distinction by other
Second Circuit case law. In particular, the court compared the
outcome of Eckes v. Card Prices Update,216 which granted
protection to the selection of “premium” baseball cards, with the
outcome of Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,217 which
denied protection to a historical theory explaining the fate of the
Hindenburg.218 The court read the former decision as resting on a
determination that the selection of “premium” baseball cards was a
matter of personal opinion and was thus subjective—a “soft” idea
meriting protection.219 The court read the latter decision as resting
on a categorization of historical theory as a building-block type of
“hard” idea that should remain in the public domain.220

213

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71 n.22 (2d Cir. 1994) (“This dichotomy between types of
ideas is supported by the wording of various legislative pronouncements, which seem
uniformly to contemplate denying protection to building-block ideas explaining processes
or discoveries, and do not refer to expressions of subjective opinion. Thus, 102(b) denies
protection to any ‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
215
Id. (“37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b), in similar terms, denies protection to ‘[i]deas, plans,
methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they
are expressed or described in a writing.’ Copyright Office Circular 31 maintains that
‘Copyright protection is not available for ideas or procedures for doing, making or
building things; scientific or technical methods or discoveries; business operations or
procedures; mathematical principles; formulas, algorithms; or any concept, process [or]
method of operation.’” (citations omitted)).
216
736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
217
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
218
See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71.
219
Id. at 71 nn.21, 23.
220
Id. at 71 n.23.
214

C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

PROTECTION FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKS

4/26/2011 6:41 PM

649

Applying this latter, expanded distinction to the Red Book’s
used car valuations, the court found that the district court should
not have applied the merger doctrine because the valuations were
ideas of the weaker, “soft” category and not the “building-block”
type of idea.221 This court reasoned that since the valuation
predictions reflected the opinions of the Red Book editors and were
not the kind of idea that “illuminates our understanding of the
phenomena that surround us or of useful processes to solve our
problems.”222 Therefore, the court held, any copyright-based
limitations on the public’s access to those valuations involved
negligible harm, especially when compared to the harm that would
be inflicted on the compilations’ creators if the merger doctrine
were applied to prevent enforcement of copyright against
wholesale takings.223
These distinctions between “soft” and “hard” facts or ideas
raise many difficulties. The Second Circuit’s distinctions between
fact or idea and expression seem to be problematic, as they rely
mainly on the measure of the fact’s or idea’s social utility.224 For
example, it is not at all clear that the Red Book’s used car
valuations were not the kind of ideas that “illuminate[] our
understanding of the phenomena that surround us.”225 As
221

Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
223
Id. The court stated:
If the public’s access to Red Book’s valuations is slightly
limited by enforcement of its copyright against CCC’s wholesale
copying, this will not inflict injury on the opportunity for public
debate, nor restrict access to the kind of idea that illuminates our
understanding of the phenomena that surround us or of useful
processes to solve our problems. In contrast, if the merger
doctrine were applied so as to bar Maclean’s enforcement of its
copyright against CCC’s wholesale takings, this would seriously
undermine the protections guaranteed by § 103 of the Copyright
Act to compilations that employ original creation in their
selection, coordination, or arrangement. It would also largely
vitiate the inducements offered by the copyright law to the
makers of original useful compilations.
Id. (citation omitted).
224
See Ginsburg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346, 379; see also CCC, 44 F.3d at 73.
225
See CCC, 44 F.3d at 71–73; see also Irene Segal Ayers, Comment, The “Facts” of
Cultural Reality: Rewarding the Line Between Fact and Expression in Copyright Law, 67
U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1999) (criticizing the court’s distinctions in Kregos and CCC).
222
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Professor Ginsburg has argued, all judges exercise this sort of
judgment of social value whenever they apply the fact/expression
or idea/expression and merger doctrines.226 The approach taken in
CCC is problematic exactly because it introduces a subjective
“test” that provides an opportunity to expand protection to ideas
and facts.
Judge Sweet’s partial dissent in Kregos echoed the above
concerns with the CCC fact/expression analysis.227 Judge Sweet
argued that it was impossible to apply the merger doctrine to the
hypothetical doctor’s list of symptoms used to identify and
diagnose a disease228 while withholding it for Kregos’s pitching
form. Disease diagnosis is no less creative and no more scientific
than predicting the results of a baseball game with the pitching
form.229 The only distinction between a system for estimating
sports odds and a system for medical diagnosis is the degree of
social benefit in each activity.230 Judge Sweet questioned whether
judgments of social utility should be the basis for distributing the
protections of copyright law.231
Kregos’s distinction between opinion or taste-based fact
selections and those that are outcome-determinative, which
subsequently developed in CCC into the distinction between “soft”
and “hard” ideas, was strongly criticized in Continental Micro, Inc.
v. HPC, Inc.232 This case dealt with the question of whether the
plaintiff’s code cards, containing space and depth information
needed by key-cutting machines to cut a specific key, were
copyrightable.233 The plaintiff argued that such data were
professional opinions regarding the most effective settings for the
226

See Ginsberg, No Sweat, supra note 13, at 346.
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 711–16 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228
Id. at 711.
229
Id. at 711 n.2.
230
Id. at 711.
231
Id. (“[T]here is the obvious distinction that a system for making medical diagnoses
is more socially beneficial than [a] system for estimating sport odds, but such a
distinction does not offer a basis for denying copyright protection to one while granting it
to the other.” (citation omitted)). But see CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994).
232
No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 102541 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1997).
233
Id. at *1–2.
227
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machine to use to cut particular keys and not non-copyrightable
facts.234
The district court pointed to the similarity between the
plaintiff’s argument and the argument raised in CCC, but rejected
both as incompatible with copyright law.235 Instead, the court held
that the code cards’ depth and spacing data were functionally
different but not expressively different and were thus not
copyrightable.236 In making its decision, the court relied on the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Publications International, Ltd. v.
Meredith Corp.,237 which denied copyright protection for recipes in
a Dannon yogurt cookbook, explaining that “Mediterranean
Meatball Salad” and “Swiss ‘n’ Cheddar Cheeseballs” describe
procedures by which readers can produce dishes and as such, are
denied protection under copyright law as a procedure, process or
system.238 This court found that for code cards, just as with a
recipe, though there may be originality and professional judgment
in creation, it is not the sort of originality which copyright
protects.239
Thus, the Continental Micro test involves determining whether
the facts, ideas, or a selection thereof, if they are neither “preexisting facts” nor original selections, constitute a “procedure,
process, or system,” or are simply analogous to a recipe. The test
does not determine whether facts are “infused with taste or
opinion.”240 However, this test is obviously applicable and useful

234

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
236
Id.
237
88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
238
Id. at 481; see also Cont’l Micro, Inc., No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 102541, at *3–4.
(“Plaintiff’s argument is similar to that of the Second Circuit in CCC Information
Services. His data, like automobile valuations, are based in part on his opinion of likely
variances caused by wear and tear on key-cutting machines and by variances among
types of key blank. Thus his figures are not facts, he argues, but expressions of his
opinion. This argument is an attractive one, but unfortunately, it does not square with the
law of copyright, at least as [it] has been interpreted in this circuit.”).
239
See Cont’l Micro, Inc, 1997 WL 102541, at *4.
240
Compare Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4. (assessing whether the data
are facts that constitute a “procedure, process or system” excluded from copyright
protection), with Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating
235
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only in circumstances in which ideas or facts comprise functional
directions. For example, application of this test to the facts of
CCC might lead one to conclude that the Red Book valuations were
copyrightable since they were not pre-existing facts and did not
provide a method for determining the value of a used car.
Although the court attempted to depict this new test as better
than those used in Kregos and CCC,241 the Continental Micro
test—attempting to answer whether facts or ideas constitute an
uncopyrightable “procedure, process, or system”—is really nothing
more than the flip side of those other tests. Instead of searching for
and identifying the protectable elements of the work—factselection based on opinion or taste as in Kregos 242 or “soft” facts
as opposed to “hard” facts as in CCC243 —the court in Continental
Micro focused on and searched for the unprotectable elements of
the work.244
Recently, however, the Second Circuit issued its decision in
New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange,
Inc.,245 which dealt with questions very similar to those discussed
in the CCC case. New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) is
an exchange for trading futures and options contracts for energy
commodities.246 At the end of each day, NYMEX calculates what
is called the “settlement price.”247 This is the “value, at the end of
trading each day, of a particular futures contract for a particular
commodity for future delivery at a particular time.”248 In setting
the settlement price for these option contracts, NYMEX broke the
contracts into two groups: those entered into during “high-volume
months” and those occurring during “low-volume months.”249 For

that “as long as selections of facts involve matters of taste and personal opinion, there is
no serious risk that withholding the merger doctrine will extend protection to an idea”).
241
See Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4.
242
See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706–07.
243
See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71–73
(2d Cir. 1994).
244
See Cont’l Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 102541, at *4–5.
245
497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
246
Id. at 110.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 111.
249
Id.
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high-volume months, the settlement prices were based on a
formula.250 The amount of data for low-volume months was lower,
requiring more data extrapolation and the use of NYMEX’s
professional judgment.251
NYMEX then published this
252
information.
Defendant Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) was
a subscriber to the futures values published by NYMEX and used
these values as is or slightly altered them based on a pre-set
formula for its customers.253 ICE’s customers then used the
London Clearing House to complete commodities trades, because
NYMEX itself could not make the trades.254
The majority opinion did not squarely address whether the
calculated values of the futures contracts were “facts.” Instead, it
affirmed the district court’s determination of uncopyrightability of
the values based on the merger doctrine.255 Thus, the court’s
discussion of Feist is dicta. In explaining the doctrines of Feist
and the issues of copyrighting facts, the majority opinion
referenced Feist’s analogy to the role of a census taker: he or she
does not create the data but instead discovers it.256 The court thus
reasoned that its task was to determine if NYMEX’s settlement
prices constituted original valuations created by NYMEX or
objective values in the marketplace which NYMEX merely
discovered.257 The majority stated that on the facts of this case the
distinction was uncommonly close and there was a strong
argument that, “like the census taker, NYMEX does not ‘author’
the settlement prices as the term is used in copyright law.”258 It
also suggested that there was a better argument that the settlement
prices were facts during high-volume months than in low-volume
months, because of the greater amount of data for use in its
formulas.259
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114–16.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116–17.
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However, the court did not decide the case on the issue of
whether or not the valuations represented original creations or
uncopyrightable facts. Rather, the court assumed without deciding
that the valuations were original creations, but applied the merger
doctrine to bar copyright in the values.260 For both high- and lowvolume months, the court explained, NYMEX sought to calculate
the actual appropriate market valuation, and not just what the value
should be, is currently, or will be in the future.261 Because the
court found that the idea (the fair market price of a given contract)
merged with the only possible expression of that idea (the price), it
applied the merger doctrine and declined to extend copyright
protection to NYMEX’s valuations.262
The concurring opinion by Judge Hall offered a different
perspective, concurring in all parts of the decision except the
majority’s discussion of Feist and the factual nature of the
settlement price.263 He argued that the majority was heightening
the standard used to determine whether a work displays some
minimal degree of creativity.264 In particular, Judge Hall disagreed
with the majority’s dicta concerning the originality of the
settlement prices for three reasons.265 First, the settlement prices
were similar to car valuations where the values are determined by
integrating a number of data sources and combined with
professional judgment.266 Second, he argued, the majority’s
argument was circular, because they labeled the settlement prices
as facts and thus unoriginal.267 (This was despite the majority’s
instruction that it is unclear whether appropriate values of futures
contracts can ever be precisely calculated).268 Third, there was
good reason to doubt that settlement prices were facts.269 They did
not replicate individual trades, nor the weighted average of the
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trades, and they also contained an override mechanism which
enabled NYMEX to change the settlement price as it deemed fit.270
However, both the majority and the concurring opinions in this
case seem to be wrong in their analysis of Feist and the question of
what constitute facts that are ineligible for copyright protection.
The majority’s analysis concerning the question of whether the
settlement prices were facts is flawed. The court’s suggestion that
the nature of the work should be determined based on the amount
of data used in reaching the settlement prices is not persuasive. As
Judge Hall correctly pointed out, the settlement prices seem to be
very much like the car valuations at issue in the CCC case. The
“author” of the work was indicating a settlement price aimed to
offer a value for futures and options contracts. The valuations,
using data and formulas, aimed to accurately predict their value.
Very much like the valuations at issue in CCC, the valuations here
should also be considered facts, regardless of the amount of data
used to calculate them. Additionally, creating distinctions between
valuations or past prices cannot be a valid way to determine what
should not be copyrightable as facts. That the valuations attempted
to predict the value of the futures does not render them no longer
factual in nature; it simply reflects an attempt to accurately assess
the futures’ objective value. The fact that these valuations had not
yet been confirmed when generated by NYMEX should not make
any difference to the analysis either. Neither should the fact that
different entities offer different valuations of the very same
product render the valuations any less factual. Therefore, the
majority should have made the additional step and determined that
the valuations were indeed facts. This would have added clarity to
the flawed CCC line of cases.271
All of the tests articulated in the CCC line of cases attest to and
exemplify the difficulties in determining what should be
considered a fact or an idea as opposed to the expression of a
compilation. However, the question, “Is this or is this not a fact?,”
270

Id. at 120–21.
See also Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009) (finding star rating and reviews of health care facilities
copyrightable because the ratings were produced based on a collection of reviews and
ratings that are analyzed and later arranged to be presented online).
271
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is ultimately fruitless. The real question instead becomes, “What
kinds of factual information call for some protection and what
kinds of information really ought to be left free for all to use?”272
It appears that the courts formulated all these tests in an attempt to
provide some guidance in the search for the “building blocks” of
knowledge. Nonetheless, this does not mean that when the courts
applied these tests to the cases discussed above they reached the
correct decisions. Therefore, the discussion that follows suggests
the adoption of a complementary “intent test” that might prove
useful in assessing and determining the nature of the work.
The present claim is that when the court attempts to determine
the nature of the work at stake—factual verses non-factual—it
should try to place itself in the shoes of the work’s creator. This
means that the court should try to understand how the creator
perceived her work and how she wanted the public to perceive it
when it was commercialized and/or offered to the public. In other
words, the court should try to get at the root of the creator’s intent
regarding the work’s nature. This search for intention, however,
must examine objective evidence, such as marketing materials,
commercial ads, or any other materials which may provide
circumstantial evidence of how the work’s creator perceived her
work and how she wanted others to perceive it.
The relevance of intention in determining a work’s nature is
not new. In fact, the famous Israeli Supreme Court decision in
Eisenman v. Qimron273 illustrates its application. In this case, the
plaintiff-respondent was a scholar who reconstructed an ancient
text in one of the Dead Sea Scrolls from manuscript fragments.274
The defendants-appellants published the completed reconstructed

272
Leo J. Raskind, Open Discussion, Copyright Symposium Part I—Copyright
Protection for Computer Databases, CD-ROMs and Actual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 351, 358 (1992).
273
C.A. 2790/93, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3)PD 817 [1993](Isr.), unofficial
translation available at http://lawatch.haifa.ac.il/heb/month/dead_sea.htm; see also
David Nimmer, Copyright in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 211–12 (2001) (criticizing the decision); Lisa Michelle Weinstein,
Comment, Ancient Works, Modern Dilemmas: The Dead Sea Scrolls Copyright Case, 43
AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1994).
274
Qimron, 54(3)PD at 822–23.
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text in their book275 without attributing the reconstruction of the
text to the plaintiff.276 The case dealt with the question of whether
the plaintiff could secure copyright in the assemblage.
The appellants’ main argument was that the respondent’s acts
of supplementing the text were no more than the reconstruction of
an existing work. Accordingly, they argued, copyright law should
not protect the deciphered text.277 However, for reasons to be
explained shortly, the Court found that the respondent was entitled
to copyright in the deciphered text.278
Examining the Israeli court’s analysis in reaching its
conclusions provides insights into the notion of intentionality. In
order to decide the question, the court first defined the subject
matter of the respondent’s right. Here, the court distinguished
between two main components of the deciphered text: the physical,
tangible, raw material—the fragments of the scroll, created about
2000 years ago and found in Qumran—and the act of assembling
the collection of the fragments into a deciphered text—physically
adding them together, arranging them, deciphering what was
written on them, and filling the gaps between the fragments.279 In
other words, the court distinguished between the fragments
themselves and the art of providing “soul and spirit” to the
fragments that made them a meaningful and living text.
The court pointed out that the scroll’s fragments are today in
the public domain in the sense that anyone who wishes to
aggregate and decipher them is permitted to do so.280 But the court
added that the fact that such materials are in the public domain is
irrelevant to the question of whether the work’s creator has
copyright in his work.281 The court instead felt that the question it
faced was whether the spirit and soul that the respondent placed in
the fragments of the scroll, with the power of his academic

275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 828–29.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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knowledge and talent, make the deciphered text, in its entirety, a
work protected by the Israeli Copyright Act of 1911.282
Under Israeli copyright law, a “literary work” enjoys copyright
protection only if it is an original work of authorship.283 Israeli
copyright law is also very similar to United States copyright law in
that it does not provide copyright protection based on the
industrious collection or sweat of the brow doctrines.284 Protection
is accorded only to expression and not ideas, facts, or other
indispensable materials.285
Relying on these standards, the court moved on to examine
whether the respondent added something original while
reconstructing the scroll’s fragments. The court looked at the
process by which the collection of fragments became a complete
text bearing content and meaning. The court identified several
phases of “creation”: matching the fragments based on their
physical compatibility, arranging the matching islands of
fragments and placing them in their putative place in the scroll,
deciphering the written text on the fragments (to the extent that
such deciphering was required) and filling the gaps between the
fragments.286
The court then examined whether there was originality in the
work as a whole.287 The court found no justification to examine
separately each of the above-discussed phases because the various
phases of the work were interdependent and had mutual influence
upon each other.288 For example, deciphering the text dictated to
some extent the arrangement of the islands of fragments; the
arrangement influenced the possible meaning of the text, its
construction and content, and the way of filling the gaps in it.289
282

Id. at 828–29.
Copyright Act, 5768-2007, 2199 LSI 34 (2007) (Isr.), available at
http://www.tau.ac.il/ law/members/birnhack/IsraeliCopyrightAct2007.pdf.
284
C.A. 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Lines Bros., S.A., 48(4) PD 133, 165 [1994]
(Isr.) (“According to the goals of copyright law it is clear that the conclusion is that labor
is not sufficient to justify according copyright protection.”).
285
Qimron, 54(3) PD at 828–29.
286
Id. at 832–33.
287
Id. at 833.
288
Id.
289
Id.
283
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In the court’s opinion, the work involved in the performance of
these various tasks revealed uncontestable originality and
creativity.290 The respondent’s work was not technical or
mechanical, like simple labor, but rather was original work in that
he turned the fragments into a living text, applying his knowledge,
skill, imagination and discretion by choosing among various
options.291
However, the court’s discussion clearly left out one major
argument that might have proved significant to its ruling. The
appellants’ main argument was that the respondent’s filling in the
gaps was not his original work, but was rather a discovery and
exposition of parts of the original text, as written 2000 years
ago.292 Thus, the appellants characterized the respondent’s work as
only a discovery of facts in the framework of historical research
and, as such, not the subject matter of copyright law.293 Therefore,
although the respondent had invested effort, time, knowledge, and
talent, the deciphered text lacked originality. The fact that no
original and complete text of the scroll was available from any
existing source by which to compare it to the deciphered text did
not transform the deciphered text from a non-copyrightable factual
work into a copyrightable fictional work. In fact, the appellants
argued, since the respondent presented the work as reflecting the
real text of the scroll, he could not argue that it was an original
work. The court did seem to consider this argument, but rejected
it, instead holding that the respondent’s work was not really a
reconstruction, but rather his own estimate of what the original
work really was or should have been.294 As such, the respondent
created a literary work and did not simply reconstruct an existing
text.
Such an analysis clearly ignored the relevance of intention in
determining originality. This copyright infringement suit would
clearly never have been brought had the appellants given credit to
the respondent for reconstructing the text. Scholars, such as the
290
291
292
293
294

Id.
Id. at 833–34.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 831–32.
Id. at 832–33.

C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

660

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/26/2011 6:41 PM

[Vol. 21:611

respondent, usually care about attribution and recognition more
than copyrights in their works.295 Of course, the court’s reasoning
clearly worked to the respondent’s advantage. However, it is not
particularly flattering to his scholarly skills. Indeed, had the
plaintiff had the same level of knowledge regarding copyright law
as he does the Dead Sea Scrolls, he would have been disturbed by
this court’s finding of originality. The respondent, like every other
serious historian, obviously intended that his work would be
perceived as a text that accurately reflected the original text as
written 2000 years ago. Attention to the respondent’s intent
regarding the work’s nature could have led the court to hold that
the work was unoriginal and, as such, did not merit copyright
protection.
Re-examining the courts’ decisions in CCC, Kregos and New
York Mercantile Exchange in light of the above analysis leads to
different results. In CCC, the creators of the Red Book had been in
the market for a long time.296 They seemed to try to establish
themselves as the authority or the industry standard in the field of
used car valuations and wanted consumers to perceive their
valuations as reflective of the real value of the car and thereby rely
on them.297 Thus, Red Book wanted its valuations to be viewed as
facts and not as personal opinions. That it did not provide the way
in which it reached the specific values, i.e., the
procedure/process/system that led it to a given valuation, does not
make the resulting valuation any less factual in nature. Similarly,
in Kregos, the creators of the pitching form viewed this form as
providing information that consumers could rely on for betting
purposes to predict a game’s outcome.298 Although the creators
did not detail the procedure/process/system used to select the
form’s data or the relative importance of each detail provided, they
clearly viewed their work as supplying information of predictive,

295

Kevin Donovan, In an Age of Abundance, Attribution is More Important than
Copying, TECHDIRT (Aug. 12, 2008, 12:45 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20080808/2157481936.shtml.
296
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).
297
CCC, 44 F.3d at 64.
298
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
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i.e., factual, value.299 Lastly, the New York Mercantile Exchange
court, too, could have employed the intent test to explore the
question whether the calculated valuations of the future contracts
were factual.
While complementary in nature, the test of intentionality might
bring more works to the public domain. It appears that the test
might be helpful in providing some loyalty to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Feist. It is not easy to determine what should be
considered fact and what should not. It is very helpful, however,
to look objectively at the intention of the creator of the work as
reflected in objective evidence and, thereby, to try to determine the
nature of the work as she saw it when she created the work and
offered it to the public.300
Indeed, all these tests aim at achieving the same goal:
preserving the building blocks of knowledge in the public domain.
299

Id. at 706; see also Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1984).
The court seemed to suggest the possibility of such an argument, but rejected its
applicability under the case’s circumstances:
It may be that a copyrighted work, here a listing of premium cards,
can be so successful that it established the “market,” but there is no
credible evidence in the record to support application of this theory
here. Moreover, there is no basis for such an inference in light of the
short time in this case between the issuance of appellants’ Guide and
appellees’ CPU. In addition, this argument would best be advanced
in a fair use context, that is, that it is necessary to copy the premium
cards and prices from appellants’ book because their book establishes
which cards are premium and the respective prices of each card.
Id.
300
While the intent test has never been recognized explicitly by American courts, there
exists some case law from which such a test can be implied, mainly based on the estoppel
doctrine. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992). Arica Institute is
a teaching organization that instructs people on finding “inner balance.” Id. at 1069–70.
The founder of the organization had written extensively on the subject and the work at
issue in this case (and that was allegedly copied by the defendant) was called “Interviews
with Oscar Ichazo.” Id. at 1070–71. At the core of his work were seven fundamental
“enneogons” associated with nine “ego fixations.” Id. Some of the enneagons in the
defendant’s book were quite similar to those in “Interviews.” Id. at 1070–71. Ichazo, the
founder of Arica, argued at trial that he discovered the ego fixations and that they were
scientifically verifiable “facts” of human nature. Id. at 1075–76. On appeal, the court
held that Ichazo was estopped from disclaiming that the nine ego fixations were were
uncopyrightable facts; after having represented to the world that his discoveries were
factual, the court held, Ichazo could not take back his claim for purposes of the litigation.
Id. at 1075.
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This goal can be achieved if courts are cautious and err on the side
of freeing information instead of enclosing it. Nonetheless, despite
the courts’ attempts at vigilance, they seemed to fail in applying
their newly created distinctions or tests, as the cases described in
this section have illustrated. The complementary intent test that
explores the subjective intent of the work’s creator can assist
courts in assessing the work’s nature.
B. Scope of Protection Under the Selection and Arrangement
Standard
The Court in Feist clearly held that an original selection or
arrangement offers minimal, “thin” protection to compilations:
[A] subsequent compiler remains free to use the
facts contained in another’s publications to aid in
preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection
and arrangement. . . . [T]he very same facts and
ideas may be divorced from the context imposed by
the author, and restated or reshuffled by second
comers, even if the author was the first to discover
the facts or to propose the ideas.301
Thus, copyright law protects only the selection and
arrangement of a factual compilation; it is limited to the
components that originated with the author302 and “[i]n no event
may copyright extend to the facts themselves.”303
However, Feist does not provide clear guidance regarding the
scope of protection available to original selections and
301

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1868). Thus, “each
subsequent compiler [need not] start from scratch and is [not] precluded from relying on
research undertaken by another. Id. at 359. Rather, the facts contained in existing works
may be freely copied because copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin
to the compiler . . . .” Id. at 359 (citations omitted); see also Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value, supra note 36, at 1868 n.12; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 719, 776, 800–02 (1989); William F. Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A
Reply, 6 COMM. & L. 11, 16 (1984).
302
Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
303
Id. at 351.
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arrangements of facts because the Court found Rural’s selection
and arrangement to be non-copyrightable.304 While it is clear that
verbatim copying of an entire compilation is not allowed when the
compilation’s selection or arrangement is original, it remains
unclear the degree to which non-verbatim copying is prohibited.
An analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision in Key
Publications305 sheds light on the extent of copying prevented by
original selection and arrangement. In that case, the court refused
to “read Feist in such a broad and self-defeating fashion”306 as to
provide that only verbatim copying of the compilation is
prevented. Instead, the court stated that subsequent compilers
cannot avoid infringement liability simply by making minor
changes to a copyrighted compilation.307 “Such a result would
render the copyright of a compilation meaningless,”308 the court
held, resulting in a change of its scope from “thin” to
“anorexic.”309 The court added that in order to establish copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must prove “substantial similarity between
those elements, and only those elements, that provide
copyrightability to the allegedly infringed compilation.”310 Thus,
since protection is limited to the original selection and
arrangement, similarity to those elements must be proven.
Applying this requirement in Key Publications, the court
determined that the plaintiff had to show substantial similarity
between the two directories with regard to their selection of
businesses or arrangement of categories in order to prevail on its
304

Id. at 363.
Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
306
Id. at 514; see also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that the defendant’s selection of data must vary from the plaintiff’s by more than
a trivial degree to avoid infringement).
307
Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 514; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
308
Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 514.
309
Id. (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
310
Id. Proof of “substantial similarity” is a basic requirement in establishing
infringement. Id.; e.g., Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Grp., Inc., 887 F.2d 399,
402 (2d Cir. 1989); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (“Just as copying is an essential element of infringement,
so substantial similarity . . . is an essential element of copying.” (citations omitted)).
305
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infringement claim.311 However, the court found no substantial
similarity in the selections of the data after it examined the key
issue: “whether the organizing principle guiding the selection of
businesses for the two publications [was] in fact substantially
similar.”312 In this case, the defendants’ directory had intentionally
copied 1,500 of the 2,000 listings from the plaintiff’s directory.313
The defendants, however, copied only 17% (1,500/9,000) of the
listings in the plaintiff’s directory and did not completely duplicate
any category containing more than a few listings.314 The court
therefore found no infringement of the plaintiff’s selection,
reasoning that there will always be significant overlap between
classified directories for a given community.315
Had the
defendants “exactly duplicated a substantial designated portion” of
the plaintiff’s directory, the court explained, infringement would
have been found.316 Thus, original selection allows significant
copying from the original work as long as the copy does not
duplicate a substantial portion of the original.317
As for the substantial similarity test for the “arrangement”
prong of the Feist standard, the Key Publications court ruled that,
311

Key Publ’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 515. “[T]he components of a compilation are
generally in the public domain, and a finding of substantial similarity or even absolute
identity as to matters in the public domain will not suffice to prove infringement.” Id. at
514; see also Kregos, 937 F.2d at 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (compilation author is only
protected against infringement of the protectable features of the compilation); 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][2][b]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010).
312
Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 516. Thus, substantial similarity is limited to the
organizing principle of selection. Id. However, protection of this principle is limited by
the idea/expression dichotomy, which limits protection to the expression of an idea and
denies protection to the idea itself.
313
Id. at 515.
314
Id.
315
Id. at 516.
316
Id. at 517; see also Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding infringement where a directory duplicated the listing of 5,000 cards designated
as “premium” in a copyrighted 18,000 card directory).
317
But see Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the defendant’s compilation would not infringe if it “differs in more than a trivial degree”
from the plaintiff’s work, essentially creating a “virtual identity” test for infringement);
Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1247, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that copying of features such as positions of symbols and street alignments in
compilations of maps did not constitute infringement).
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as a matter of law, the arrangements in the two compilations were
not substantially similar318 since only three of the twenty-eight
categories in the defendants’ directory duplicated any of the 260
categories in the plaintiff’s directory.319 It should be emphasized,
however, that many of the listings in both directories appeared
under similar headings. The court found the placement of listings
within categories to be “the sort of mechanical task that does not
merit copyright protection,” but distinguished placement within
categories from original arrangements of the categories
themselves.320
Such a distinction, however, as others have already argued, is
baseless.321 Neither the placement of listings within a category nor
other decisions about arrangement in a directory are particularly
subjective; both seem to be dictated by utilitarian considerations.
The categories in a classified directory are arranged alphabetically,
and are therefore clearly unoriginal arrangements under Feist.322
Likewise, category names are chosen based on what will most
likely come to mind when a consumer thinks about a product or
service offered by a business listed within that category.323
III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD AND ITS SCOPE TO DATABASES
Feist’s standard for copyright protection for compilations,
coupled with the courts’ elaborations on this standard, including
the courts’ search for the “ideas,” “facts,” and “expression” of
compilations, all contributed to significant difficulties regarding
application of this standard to databases. Furthermore, the scope
of protection provided under this standard has implications
regarding producers’ ability to provide meaningful copyright
protection for their products.

318

Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 515.
Id.
320
Id.
321
See generally John F. Hayden, Recent Development, Copyright Protection of
Computer Databases After Feist, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 215 (1991).
322
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
323
For example, information about legal services is listed under generic headings such
as “lawyer” or “attorney.”
319
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First, most databases are comprehensive in nature.324 They
therefore do not meet the subjective selection or arrangement
standard because there is no real selection when the database
includes the entire universe in a given field. Indeed, the scope of
databases is generally based on objective criteria325 so that users
can exercise and employ their own selection and arrangement of
the underlying data.326 In the online context, most databases are
actually exhaustive in nature and do not demonstrate any selection
or arrangement. Even the modern Internet-based white pages
directories allow a user to conduct a limited search rather than an
exhaustive search. As a result, most online databases will probably
easily fail the original arrangement and selection test.
Second, identifying discernible arrangement within a database
is difficult.327 The protection of databases that is based on original
arrangement, therefore, becomes unlikely.328 Even if original
324

See Brief for Information Industry Association and ADAPSO, The Computer
Software and Services Industry Association, Inc., as Amici Curiae in support of neither
party at 19–20 n.16, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (No.
89-1909) (arguing that under the original selection standard “copyright protection would
be afforded to compilations in inverse proportion to their comprehensiveness, which is to
say (in many cases) to their commercial value and usefulness”); see also Fin. Info. Inc. v.
Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984) (basing selectivity on the
omission of facts); Hicks, supra note 100, at 1006 (noting that most compilations “stand
out for their exhaustiveness and usually contain components selected on the basis of
objective, not subjective, criteria”).
325
See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1006.
326
Id. (noting that a compilation listing “all known inhabitants of a city . . . would
exhibit insufficient subjectivity”). But see id. at 1006–07 (arguing that subjectivity is
involved even in the selection of objective criteria); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (finding that the selection of name, town, and telephone
number “could not be more obvious”).
327
The physical arrangement of data within a database is important to the efficiency of
the database system. See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1014. This concept of arrangement,
however, is purely functional, and protection of any original method of physically
arranging data would surely be barred by the idea/expression dichotomy as embodied in §
102(b) of the Copyright Act.
328
Nat’l Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(stating that a database stores information “without arrangement and form”); see also
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 531 (1981) (arguing that “there is no
particular arrangement to protect”). But see Hicks, supra note 100, at 1022 (criticizing
this view as “factually incorrect”). This lack of arrangement is, however, a very positive
feature of databases since it allows users to arrange data in a format they find most
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arrangement exists, copyists can simply rearrange the data to avoid
infringement, without sacrificing the utility of the new database.329
Third, new technologies enhance the functionality of databases
in a manner that makes reliance on subjective selection and
arrangement almost impossible.330
Since new technologies,
especially developments related to database system software, allow
easy processing of voluminous amounts of data,331 there is no need
to exercise subjectivity in selection, as there was for old-fashioned
databases.
Fourth, the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of
merger raise additional challenges for database compilers.
Specifically, the courts’ formulation of several post-Feist doctrines
regarding copyright in compilations—as exemplified by courts’
attempts to identify the “idea,” “fact,” and “expression” of a
work—leaves compilers facing increased uncertainty as to whether
their databases will ultimately be found to be protectable. The
court in Kregos explained that the more generally an idea of a
compilation is defined, the less likely it is that the doctrine of
merger will apply.332 This need for generality, however, is at odds
with the subjective selection or arrangement requirement which
requires that database producers provide instances where
subjective decisions were made.333 Thus, the interaction of these
two requirements contributes to even weaker copyright protection
for databases. Furthermore, like the hypothetical system in Kregos
that weighed statistics, database systems generally produce useful
results, likely to make them fall within the ambit of the merger
doctrine.

useful. See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1014 (“The database compiler leaves the
determination of the manner in which data is viewed to the discretion of the user within
the confines of the software.”).
329
See Hicks, supra note 100, at 1023 (noting that rearrangement will avoid
infringement and that the ease with which a technically proficient party can rearrange the
data “leads to shallow protection”).
330
See Hayden, supra note 321, at 229–31.
331
See id.
332
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
333
If subjectivity exists, it will be found in the details of the selection process. See
Hicks, supra note 100, at 1026.

C03_BITTON_ 20110425 (DO NOT DELETE)

668

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/26/2011 6:41 PM

[Vol. 21:611

Lastly, the scope of protection provided under the “substantial
similarity” standard, which prevents verbatim copying, imposes an
additional limitation on database compilers’ ability to protect their
products’ original selection and arrangement. Such a rule prevents
verbatim copying by parties who lack the technical expertise to
make minimal changes to the material’s selection or arrangement
to avoid infringement, in reality deterring only a small group of
unsophisticated users. Moreover, significant problems of detection
and prevention of such behavior, mainly by individual users,
remain.334
CONCLUSION
Feist’s progeny seems to be very troubling for many reasons.
It fails to provide guidance and coherence regarding key questions
pertaining to copyright doctrine. Many courts fail to faithfully
apply Feist’s holding, finding originality where none exists.
Courts should exercise more diligence in searching for creative
selection and arrangement or in distilling the work’s nature (as
either factual or fictional). Providing protection for such works
upsets the delicate balance between what should be protectable by
intellectual property and what should reside in the public domain.
Courts can employ the intent test in exploring the work’s nature
and should exercise more caution when handling works whose
arrangement and selection is dictated by functional considerations.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the creative selection
and arrangement test for compilations copyright is probably an
obsolete test for most databases offered online because they most
often purposefully lack selection and arrangement.335 Therefore,
given this new environment, this protectability threshold is
inapplicable to most databases.

334

Database developers experience significant difficulties tracking individual computer
systems to determine if they contain illegal copies of their products. Moreover, the costs
of bringing individual infringement actions add to this difficulty. See Hicks, supra note
100, at 1023.
335
See Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 35, at 1869 (noting that
arrangement in factual compilations “may bear little, if any, connection to the work’s
central importance as a source of information”).
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One might argue that copyright protection based on original
selection and arrangement is insufficient for modern electronic
databases and is probably meaningless for most of them, exposing
them to misappropriation by others thus disincentivizing their
creation.336 As I have argued elsewhere, this argument is not wellfounded. There is no empirical evidence that there exists a piracy
problem in the database industry.337 Therefore, there is no reason
to make any legislative changes. If the database industry, other
producers of fact-intensive works, is able to make the case that a
problem exists, then we might want to consider the provision of
some form of protection. That day has not yet come, so if the
system is not broken there is no need to fix it . . . .

336

See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003:
Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 11 (2003) (statement of
David Carson, General Counsel, Copyright Office of the U.S. Library of Cong.)
(“[T]here was a gap in existing legal protection, which could not be satisfactorily filled
through the use of technology alone . . . . Without legislation to fill the gap, publishers
were likely to react to the lack of security by investing less in the production of databases
. . . .”); Collection of Information Antipiracy Act; Trade Dress Protection Act; and
Continued Oversight of Internet Domain Name Protection: Hearing on H.R. 2652 and
H.R 3163 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 386–402 (1998) (statement of Daniel C. Duncan, Vice President,
Government Relation, Information Industry Association) (advocating strong protection
for databases).
337
Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database
Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93 (2006).

